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D. Poole, The Independent Choice Logic for modelling multiple agents under un- 
certainty 
Inspired by game theory representations, Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, structured Markov decision 
process models, logic programming, and work in dynamical systems, the independent choice logic (ICL) is 
a semantic framework that allows for independent choices (made by various agents, including nature) and a 
logic program that gives the consequence of choices. This representation can be used as a specification for 
agents that act in a world, make observations of that world and have memory, as well as a modelling tool 
for dynamic environments with uncertainty. The rules specify the consequences of an action, what can be 
sensed and the utility of outcomes. This paper presents a possible-worlds semantics for ICL, and shows how 
to embed influence diagrams, structured Markov decision processes, and both the strategic (normal) form 
and extensive (game-tree) form of games within the ICL. It’s argued that the ICL provides a natural and 
concise representation for multi-agent decision-making under uncertainty that allows for the representation of 
structured probability tables, the dynamic construction of networks (through the use of logical variables) and 
a way to handle uncertainty and decisions in a logical representation. 
S. Russell, Rationality and intelligence 
The long-term goal of our field is the creation and understanding of intelligence. Productive research in 
AI, both practical and theoretical, benefits from a notion of intelligence that is precise enough to allow 
the cumulative development of robust systems and general results. The concept of rafional qency has long 
been considered a leading candidate to fulfill this role. This paper outlines a gradual evolution in the formal 
conception of rationality that brings it closer to our informal conception of intelligence and simultaneously 
reduces the gap between theory and practice. Some directions for future research are indicated, 
S. Kraus, Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments 
Automated intelligent agents inhabiting a shared environment must coordinate their activities. Cooperation- 
not merely coordination-may improve the performance of the individual agents or the overall behavior of the 
system they form. Research in Distributed Attificial Intelligence (DAI) addresses the problem of designing 
automated intelligent systems which interact effectively. DA1 is not the only field to take on the challenge of 
understanding cooperation and coordination. There are a variety of other multi-entity environments in which 
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the entities coordinate their activity and cooperate. Among them are groups of people, animals, particles, 
and computers. We argue that in order to address the challenge of building coordinated and collaborated 
intelligent agents, it is beneficial to combine AI techniques with methods and techniques from a range of 
multi-entity fields, such as game theory, operations research, physics and philosophy. To support this claim, we 
describe some of our projects, where we have successfully taken an interdisciplinary approach. We demonstrate 
the benefits in applying multi-entity methodologies and show the adaptations, modifications and extensions 
necessary for solving the DA1 problems. 
T.W. Sandholm and V.R. Lesser, Coalitions among computationally bounded agents 
This paper analyzes coalitions among self-interested agents that need to solve combinarorial optimization prob- 
lems to operate efficiently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization 
problem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individually. A model of bounded rutio- 
nality is adopted where computation resources are costly. It is not worthwhile solving the problems optimally: 
solution quality is decision-theoretically traded off against computation costs. A normative, application- and 
protocol-independent theory of coalitions among bounded-rational agents is devised. The optimal coalition 
structure and its stability are significantly affected by the agents’ algorithms’ performance profiles and the 
cost of computation. This relationship is first analyzed theoretically. Then a domain classification including 
rational and bounded-rational agents is introduced. Experimental results are presented in vehicle routing with 
real data from five dispatch centers. This problem is NP-complete and the instances are so large that-with 
current technology-any agent’s rationality is bounded by computational complexity. 
Y. Shoham and M. Tennenholtz, On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, 
analysis, and simulations 
We define the notion of social convenrions in a standard game-theoretic framework, and identify various 
criteria of consistency of such conventions with the principle of individual rationality. We then investigate the 
emergence of such conventions in a stochastic setting; we do so within a stylized framework currently popular 
in economic circles, namely that of stochastic games. This framework comes in several forms; in our setting 
agents interact with each other through a random process, and accumulate information about the system. As 
they do so, they continually reevaluate their current choice of strategy in light of the accumulated information. 
We introduce a simple and natural strategy-selection rule, called highest cumulative reward (HCR). We show 
a class of games in which HCR guarantees eventual convergence to a rationally acceptable social convention. 
MOSI importantly, we investigate the efficiency with which such social conventions are achieved. We give an 
analytic lower bound on this rate, and then present results about how HCR works out in practice. Specifically, 
we pick one of the most basic games, namely a basic coordination game (as defined by Lewis), and through 
extensive computer simulations determine not only the effect of applying HCR, but also the subtle effects 
of various system parameters, such as the amount of memory and the frequency of update performed by all 
agents. 
D. Koller and A. Pfeffer, Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems 
A system with multiple interacting agents (whether artificial or human) is often best analyzed using game- 
theoretic tools. Unfortunately, while the formal foundations arc well-established, standard computational tech- 
niques for game-theoretic reasoning are inadequate for dealing with realistic games. This paper describes the 
G&r system, an implemented system that allows the specification and efficient solution of large imperfect in- 
formation games, The system contains the first implementation of a recent algorithm, due to Keller, Megiddo, 
and von Stengel. Experimental results from the system demonstrate that the algorithm is exponentially faster 
than the standard algorithm in practice, not just in theory. It therefore allows the solution of games that 
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are orders of magnitude larger than were previously possible. The system also provides a new declarative 
language for compactly and naturally representing games by their rules. As a whole, the Gala system provides 
the capability for automated game-theoretic analysis of complex real-world situations. 
R.I. Brafman and M. Tennenholtz, Modeling agents as qualitative decision makers 
We investigate the semantic foundations of a method for modeling agents as entities with a mental state 
which was suggested by McCarthy and by Newell. Our goals are to formalize this modeling approach and 
its semantics, to understand the theoretical and practical issues that it raises, and to address some of them. In 
particular, this requires specifying the model’s parameters and how these parameters are to be assigned (i.e., 
their growding). We propose a basic model in which the agent is viewed as a qualitative decision maker 
with beliefs, preferences, and decision strategy; and we show how these components would determine the 
agent’s behavior. We ground this model in the agent’s interaction with the world, namely, in its actions. This 
is done by viewing model construction as a constraint satisfaction problem in which we search for a model 
consistent with the agent’s behavior and with our general background knowledge. In addition, we investigate 
the conditions under which a mental state model exists, characterizing a class of “goal-seeking” agents that 
can be modeled in this manner; and we suggest two criteria for choosing between consistent models, showing 
conditions under which they lead to a unique choice of model. 
